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EVIDENCE-EXCLUSION OF WRITTEN STATEMENTS
IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL
DEATH ACCIDENTS
Plaintiff, injured in an automobile accident, having secured an
unsatisfied judgment against the negligent driver of the truck in
which she was a passenger, sues the insurance carrier of the cor-
poration employing the driver. Under the Virginia statute the
crucial question in the case is whether the driver had been instruct-
ed by his employer not to carry riders, thus removing the case
from the coverage of the policy. The driver having testified that he
had not received such instructions, counsel for the insurance com-
pany offered in evidence, to impeach his testimony, a written state-
ment which he had made after the accident. The trial court refused
to admit the statement, basing its action upon the Code provision:
" . . In an action to recover for a personal injury or death by
wrongful act or neglect, no ex parte affidavit or statement in writing
other than a deposition, after due notice, of a witness as to the facts
or circumstances attending the wrongful act or neglect complained
of, shall be used to contradict him as witness in the case."1 On ap-
peal by the insurance company, held that the statement was not
within the scope of the statute, and should have been admitted:
first, because "action to recover for a personal injury or death by
wrongful act or neglect" refers only to tort actions, and not to a
contract action based upon an insurance policy; and second, because
the statement did not relate to "the facts or circumstances attending
the wrongful act or neglect," but to "facts or circumstances attend-
ing a conference prior to the accident," at which the instructions had
been given. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Venable, 194
Va. 357, 73 S.E2d 366 (1952).
This case presents an interesting problem of statutory inter-
pretation. The court quotes from an earlier opinion stating clearly
the public policy which caused the Legislature to enact the statute:
"The purpose of the . .. statute was to correct an unfair
practice which had developed, by which claim adjusters
would hasten to the scene of the accident and obtain writ-
ten statements from all eye-witnesses. Frequently, these
statements were neither full nor correct and were signed
by persons who had not fully recovered from shock and
hence were not in full possession of their faculties. Later
1. Va. Codc Ann. 1 8-293 (1930).
such persons, when testifying as witnesses, would be con-
fronted by their signed statements and, after admitting
their signatures, these statements would be introduced in
evidence as impeachment of their testimony given on the
witness stand. ' '2
Judge Hutcheson has made a forceful statement of the im-
portance of this public policy:
"If admissions in favor of the insurer contained in an ex
parte statement it has procured from the claimed addi-
tional assured, the driver of the vehicle, are binding on
the named assured, and on persons claiming to have been
injured by the vehicle, the rights of the named assured
and of third parties under such policies would be of small
value. For it is unfortunately true that ex parte affidavits,
which do not speak the truth, are easily procurable from
willing persons, who, though they may not be corrupt,
may be ignorant and easily led. If, to this effect against
the affiant, there is added by the rule invoked, an effect
against third persons, such affidavits will be at a premium,
and the race for them will be on." 3
The Virginia Legislature enacted the exclusionary rule of evi-
dence in the light of the well-known pernicious activities of "ambu-
lance chasers," prominent among which have been the pursuit with
unseemly haste of prospective parties and witnesses, and the en-
deavor to tie them down to a particular view of the accident through
such a written statement. The likelihood that any such statement
will be unfair and unreliable is obvious. If nothing worse occurs,
the selection of the facts set forth in the statement will be made
from a biased and misleading standpoint.
Dean Pound has stated:
"Perhaps the most significant advance in the modern science
of law is the change from the analytical to the functional attitude." 4
The outstanding position of Justice Brandeis as one of Amherica's
greatest jurists is in large measure due to his leadership in this
advance. It would seem that in this decision the court has failed
to keep step with the procession.
The statutesets forth a rule of evidence, designed to remove
what experience has shown to be an obstruction to efficient as-
2. Har6 v, Htudou. 180 Va. 210, 220. 22 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1942).
3Columbia Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 101 F.2d 151. 152 (5th Cir. 1939).
4. Administrati#v Aj.lication of Legal Staidardi Proc. A. B. A. .445. 449 (1919).
certainment of the truth. From the standpoint of the function of
the statute, it is immaterial whether the action is one in tort or in
contract-in suing the insurance company the action is still one
"to recover for a personal injury or death by wrongful act". A
legalistic interpretation of a statute should not be used, but the case
does not even represent sound legalistic interpretation, as the court
reads the word "tort" into an evidence statute.
In some jurisdictions such statements are not subject to special
exclusionary rules, and are admitted for impeachment purposes
like any other contradictory statements by a witness, subject, of
course, as to credibility, to critical examination as to the circum-
stances under which they were given.5 In other states the admission
or rejection of such statements is left to the discretion of the trial
judge.6 Whatever may be the relative merits of these views (and
there is a great deal to be said for leaving it to the discretion of the
trial judge), the Virginia courts should give full effect to the legis-
lative public policy of the state against the use of such statements.
As to the point that the statement was not "as to the facts or
circumstances attending the wrongful act or neglect complained of",
but to prior conference, the court adopts what may be termed a
reified, or physical, concept, of what are the facts and circumstances,
instead of. what may be termed a mental concept, the latter con-
siderikig logical relevance and not physical proximity in time or
space to the crash of the automobiles or other misadventure. The
use of such physical concepts has been productive of many errors
in the development of the jurisprudence of this country.7 As the
vital fact in the case under consideration is the presence or absence
of instructions to the driver, that fact, properly regarded, is the
most important of the "facts or circumstances attending the wrong-
ful act".
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